A few thoughts on the Euthyphro dilemma
 

I've been thinking about the Euthyphro dilemma lately and I made a response a few days ago to an atheist on YouTube named TheoreticalBS and his comments on the Euthyphro dilemma (if you want to watch it, it's right here: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IO0iVxIXnPk). In this thread I'd like to elaborate on some of those ideas and discuss my solution to the dilemma.


The Euthyphro dilemma is as follows:

“Is something moral because God commands it or does God command it because it is moral?”

It is asserted that both of these possibilities are problematic. One objection to the first possibility is that this opens up the possibility of abhorrent commands. In one possible world, God would command that we should love our neighbor, but what is to prevent him from commanding that we should torture innocent babies for our pleasure?

It is said that the second possibility would be problematic because that would mean that morality is independent of God. If morality is independent of God, then you don't need theism for morality.

The typical apologetic response to this is that neither of these options are accurate. Instead, something is moral because it is in God's nature. I would agree that this is more accurate. If we were to say that something is moral BECAUSE God commands it, that would imply that God's commands are the ultimate standard of morality. But from a Christian worldview, God bases his commands from his nature.

Some have claimed that this does not free us from the Euthyphro dilemma. They have argued that a new Euthyphro dilemma can be proposed:

“Is something moral because it is in God's nature or is it in God's nature because it is moral?”

Of these two, I accept the first option. Things are moral because they are in God's nature. This option is still subject to the objections raised against the proposal that things are moral because they are commanded by God, but I don't any of them convincing problems.

In this thread, I will mainly cover one objection, the one that I previously mentioned. That is, if things are good solely because they are in God's nature, then why couldn't God have had a different nature, one which would obligate us to torture innocent babies, for instance?


Arbitrary morality in different worlds

I have two problems with the claim that the first option of the Euthyphro dilemma leads to arbitrary morality (in this sense).

My first problem is that this claim relies upon the assertion that moral facts remain the same in every possible world. If this assertion is false, then a world in which we are morally obligated to torture innocent babies for fun would be possible, and thus choosing this first possibility of the Euthyphro dilemma would not really be problematic. Personally, I don't see a lot of problems with moral facts varying in hypothetical possible worlds, except that we may feel that this couldn't be true.

The second problem that I have is that this makes morality arbitrary only in the case of a God who has a nature that could vary in different worlds. In other words, this first option wouldn't be a problem for Christian morality because if Yahweh's nature was different, then we simply wouldn't define him as Yahweh. In every possible world in which morality is dependent upon Yahweh's nature, moral facts will stay the same.

So let's say that Yahweh's nature is the same in every possible world in which he exists. Another potential objection would be that if this were the case, then God's nature wouldn't really be the ultimate source of morality, but it would be the things that God's nature is based upon (like love, forgiveness, etc). If this were the case, then God wouldn't be necessary for morality. This is a bad argument though. Yes, you can describe God's nature in a different way by figuring out what the criteria are for 'being in God's nature', but if God's nature were different or if God didn't exist, then those criteria would be meaningless. It would no longer be true that love, forgiveness, etc are objectively moral (unless we're considering a Platonistic world with the same moral facts). The only reason why love, forgiveness, etc are considered moral is because that's what God's nature is.

Arbitrary standard

Is there a reason or justification for God's nature being the way that it is or is it simply arbitrary? In this case, I would say that God's nature must be arbitrary and this isn't a problem. Any objective moral standard must be arbitrary, actually. If there was a further explanation of the ultimate standard for morality, then we would have to ask what the reason for that standard is...on and on into infinite regress. It has to stop somewhere and no matter what, the standard will be arbitrary in this sense. This is true regardless of whether we hold a Christian view of morality, a Platonistic view of morality or whether we simply reject the idea of objective morality altogether. In Christianity, the ultimate standard would be God's nature. In Platonism, the ultimate standard would be whatever moral facts happen to exist eternally. Without objective morality, the standard is whatever the person decides it to be (least amount of suffering, for example). The main difference between objective morality and subjective morality is that if we lived in a world with objective morality, it would actually be true that our actions were morally right or wrong.

Eh?

If god* asked you to kill someone, would you seek a priest a target or a doctor?

That depends. What's your point?

Depends on the answer.

Well, it's off topic but I guess I'll answer.

If it is absolutely certain that God exists and that morality and His commands are rooted in his nature, then logically, we ought to kill the person.

In that hypothetical world all of these statements would be absolutely true:

P1 - If God commands me to kill a person, then that command is rooted in his nature.
P2 - I ought to do what is rooted in God's nature
P3 - God commanded me to kill a person
C - I ought to kill a person


If there is any reason for doubting any of these premises, then there is doubt as to whether we ought to kill someone. If I thought that I heard God telling me to kill someone, I would not have absolute certainty about all of those premises, so I would instead seek a doctor :).

I'm sorry, but that comes nowhere close to solving the Euthyphro Dilemma. If it's simply because it's in God's nature then God has no choice in it at all, in which case you cannot praise God for his moral choices (after all, God is just being who he is). It's like someone born with a genetic defect - it's not their fault so they cannot be blamed (and conversely, someone born with good genes cannot take credit for it).

If you truly want to praise God for his moral choices then he must have a choice in it (that is, God must be able to make the wrong choice). If God has no choice but being moral then God's morality is meaningless. If I have no choice but to make the right choice, can I be praised for making right choices?

I don't think that I need to 'praise God' for his moral choices. The Euthyphro dilemma tries to force theists to accept that morality is separate from God's commands/nature. How is this supposed problem of yours problematic for theism??

No, the Eythyphro Dilemma forces theists to choose between two options: 1) God's morality is meaningless or 2) morality is separate from God. The solution that theists seek is one that does not result in either of these options - that is, morality is not separate from God but still has meaning. Your "solution" does nothing to resolve this (God's morality is still meaningless).

Sorry, generally I've seen the Euthyphro dilemma used by Platonists, and they try to show that the first option is problematic and thus the second option is correct.

Can you elaborate on your problem with my answer (it is moral because it is in God's nature)? I don't know what you mean by "meaning". The result of things being moral solely because they are in God's nature is that morality is in a sense arbitrary, but how is this meaningless?

Now I know why I've always found theo-illogical philosophy to be such brain numbing bullshit ....

Well, I find that situation to be incredibly unlikely as well. That's why I'm using it as a hypothetical.

You carry on hypotheticalising - I'll eye-roll & cringe at the bollocks of it all from the sidelines.

Well, looking up the dictionary, for something to be meaningful it has to provide significance, purpose or importance. Your scenario of morality being equated with God's nature is meaningless since it provides no information on what makes an action right or wrong (morality is simply asserted). It makes God and morality a tautology - remember that just because a statement is true does not make it meaningful (e.g., 1 = 1 is true but is essentially meaningless). Such a theory has no significance and nothing important to convey - you might as well just say "God is moral because he is moral".

I have always thought that theology cannot be carried out by a religious adherent.

My definition would include the rational study of the religious book. A believer would study the bible believing it to be true. A mind that believes something with no evidence cannot be called rational.

meanwhile back in the real world I'll go off to do some work and maybe help a few people and worry about the morality of it all afterwards- or maybe just have a drink?